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CASE COMMENTS

artificial distinctions made by the statutes and the uncertainty attributable to the common law on this point, and thereby makes
discussion of these distinctions largely an academic matter. The
reasoning which supports the maintenance of these special relationships seems obscure. But the rule, vague as it may be, still exists.
40 C.J.S. Homocide § 108 (1944). However, this requirement has
seemingly been abandoned in England where its uncertain roots lie.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
In the United States, statements can be found to the effect that
strangers may be defended. State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800, 819
(1883). But the Greer case involved brothers, consequently the
statement about strangers is dictum as are many similar statements
in cases in this area.
The logical solution to this problem would appear to be the
one adopted by the MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1958). This solution grants the intervener the right to use such
force in the defense of others, including strangers, as he could use
in his own defense with the provision that the reasonable mistake
of fact doctrine will apply both in regard to the amount of force
necessary and in regard to the fault, or lack thereof, of the apparent
victim who is being defended.
Charles Henry Rudolph, Jr.

Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Indictment for Conspiracy to
Murder
D was indicted for the murder of X and upon the trial of that
offense the jury was unable to agree and was discharged. Subsequently, a joint indictment was returned against D and four other
persons charging them with conspiracy to murder X, and also
charging the murder of X. Upon the separate trial of D on the
indictment for conspiracy the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.
D was discharged in that proceeding and the circuit court fixed a
date for the second trial of D upon the original indictment for
murder. D filed a plea of former jeopardy and prayed that he be
released and discharged from the charge of murder in the first
indictment. The circuit court held D's plea of former jeopardy to
be insufficient in law and D asked for a writ of prohibition from
the West Virginia Supreme Court to prevent him from being twice
put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense. Held, writ
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of prohibition awarded. One acquitted of conspiracy to murder a
designated person had been subject to former jeopardy, precluding
prosecution for murder of the same person in the same transaction
where, in the trial of the defendant for conspiracy to murder he was
tried for the crime of murder, in view of the statute which provides
that if the death of any person shall result from the conspiracy
every person engaged in such conspiracy shall be guilty of murder
of the first degree. State ex rel. Zirk v. Muntzing, 122 S.E.2d 851
(W. Va. 1961).
The principal case raises some important questions with reference to West Virginia's peculiar conspiracy statute, W. VA. CODE
ch. 61, art. 6, § 7 (Michie 1961). This statute, commonly referred
to as the "Red Men's Act," creates in the first paragraph, an offense which is a misdemeanor whereas the second paragraph contains the elements of a felony. State v. Winkler, 142 W. Va. 266,
95 S.E.2d 57 (1956). The second paragraph provides, inter alia,
that if the death of any person should result from the conspiracy
every person engaged in the conspiracy shall be guilty of murder of
the first degree. Moreover one indicted for conspiracy to murder
a person, which indictment also charges the murder of that same
person, can also be convicted under W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 2, § 1
(Michie 1961), which creates the crime of murder. State v. Roush,
95 W. Va. 132, 120 S.E. 304 (1923); State v. McCoy, 61 W. Va.
258, 57 S.E. 294 (1907).
The question which arises is whether a conviction or acquittal
on an indictment charging conspiracy to murder a person and also
charging his murder will constitute former jeopardy in a later prosecution for murder of the same person. Several problems are evident
in arriving at an answer to this question. To sustain a conspiracy
charge, evidence of some agreement or consent is necessary, while
proof of the commission of the crime is not generally required. But
to sustain a conviction of the substantive crime, it would be necessary to prove the commission of the crime, whereas evidence of an
agreement to commit the crime would not be necessary. Annot.,
92 L. Ed. 185 (1948). Where the indictment charges both conspiracy to murder and murder of the same person, State v. McCoy,
supra, held that the conspiracy part of the indictment could be
eliminated, leaving a good indictment for murder. This being so, it
would appear that former jeopardy would attach under the West
Virginia conspiracy statute. The statute itself is quite adamant-
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"... if the death of any person shall result from the commission
of such offense, every person engaged in the commission thereof
shall be guilty of murder of the first degree .... " Thus it would
appear that anytime one is tried on an indictment charging him
with conspiracy to murder a particular person and the indictment
also charges the murder of that person, he has been tried on an
indictment for murder of that particular person precluding any subsequent prosecution for the murder of that person. This would seem
to be true whether or not the trial of the conspiracy indictment is
converted into a trial for murder.
In determining when one would be twice put in jeopardy of
life and liberty for the same offense one of two tests is used. The
first, known as the "same transaction" test, sustains a plea of former
jeopardy if both offenses were part of the same criminal transaction.
Another approach to this problem, and the one apparently used
by a majority of jurisdictions, is the "same evidence" test. That is,
a conviction upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required
to support the second indictment would have been sufficient to
warrant a conviction upon the first indictment. Lugar, Criminal
Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REV. 317
(1954). West Virginia, in light of the principal case, and considering State v. Friedley, 73 W. Va. 684, 80 S.E. 1112 (1914),
would appear to follow the "same evidence" test. It is evident that
the situation at hand meets both tests of former jeopardy. The indictment charging conspiracy to murder a person as well as charging
his murder and the later indictment for murder both grew out of
the same criminal transaction. Similarly, the evidence necessary for
a conviction on the indictment for murder would be the same as
that required for conviction on the first indictment since the first
indictment is also good as an indictment for murder.
It would appear that it is impossible under the "Red Men's
Act" to draft an indictment charging conspiracy to murder a person
and charging also his murder that would not constitute former
jeopardy to a subsequent indictment for murder of the same person.
Undoubtedly this situation lessens the usefulness of the conspiracy
statute.
What then, accounts for the adoption of this statute? It appears
that, in 1882 when this act was passed, bands of men assuming
to take the law into their own hands inhabited certain sections of
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the state. These men inflicted severe punishment and even death
on those falling within their grasp and a desperate remedy was
needed. It was to punish and suppress such combinations and
conspiracies that the act was passed. State v. Bingham, 42 W. Va.
234, 24 S.E. 883 (1896); State v. Porter, 25 W. Va. 685 (1885).
The crime of conspiracy is complete with the unlawful combination and is punishable whether or not the contemplated crime is
consummated. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947). The
real purpose of such a statute, then, is to make punishable such
unlawful confederations. It is unfortunate that West Virginia's conspiracy statute is of such a nature as to prevent its full use in the
punishment of a conspiracy to murder where the murder is also
charged, without constituting former jeopardy in a later prosecution
for the same murder.
Forest Jackson Bowman

Master and Servant-Fraud in the Inducement of an Employment
Contract-Effect Under Federal Employers' Liability Act
P brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 - 60 (1952), to recover for injuries caused
by D's negligence. D contended that P was not entitled to recover
because D had hired P in reliance on P's false representations concerning his physical condition. Therefore, P was not an "employee"
within the meaning of the statute. The trial court's action in directing
a verdict for D was sustained by the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, reversed. To facilitate congressional policy expressed in the
act, the word "employee" must be interpreted in its ordinary meaning, and generally, the status of employees who gain their position
by fraud must be recognized for the purposes of the act. Still v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 82 Sup. Ct. 148 (1961).
In the instant case, the Supreme Court has limited the doctrine
established by Minneapolis St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock, 279
U. S. 410 (1929), to the "precise facts" of that case, and employees guilty of the precise kind of fraud perpetrated in that case
may be barred from recovering under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The purpose of this comment is to discuss the effects
of the limitation of that doctrine.
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